Reports and Publications

America’s allies are heavily reliant on the United States for security. These dependencies belie the potential power of our partners – and America’s growing fiscal constraints.

The United States faces a growing risk of multi-front war against Russia, China and Iran. The optimal response to this danger would be a sequential strategy aimed at inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia in Ukraine on a faster timeline than China is prepared to move against Taiwan. But for that strategy to work, the United States must use the current window wisely to shore up the situation in Eastern Europe, broker a more effective division-of-labor with allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and reform the U.S. defense industrial base.

Washington cannot shrink from great-power competition where U.S. security is threatened, but nor can it form a strategy on the assumption that it possesses unlimited resources to compete, with equal effort, in all the world’s major theaters at the same time. This paper details that dilemma and outline foreign policy approaches that could be framed in response. The goal is not to dictate a specific American strategy, but to develop a framework for focusing debate.

China is making strides in its effort to secure its energy supply, undercutting the threat of an American blockade, potentially increasing Beijing’s willingness for war.

Built on the conviction that political order is engineered through a top-down process, Western foreign policy assumes that the state apparatus creates domestic order, while international institutions and rules build global order. Accordingly, what establishes a more efficient and lasting order is nothing more than the right application of power in its military, economic, or institutional forms.

The reform package best adapted to generate the broadest possible corporate and state-based coalition is by focusing on strengthening what this report designates as the defense industrial “sub-base” (DISB).

27th Annual Economist Government Roundtable –https://events.economist.com/events-conferences/27th-annual-economist-government-roundtable/

This paper outlines how Europe can contribute to alleviating the “two-front” predicament in U.S. global strategy. It shows how Europeans can help free up the United States’ strategic bandwidth in Europe so as to enable a proper U.S. prioritization of China without weakening Europe’s deterrence architecture. The paper also shows how Europeans can contribute to U.S.-led efforts to uphold deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Classic texts – whether by Roman historians such as Tacitus or Greek tragedians such as Aeschylus or Florentine diplomats such as Francesco Guicciardini – give us important, and even unusual, insights into strategy. They certainly do not supply a ready-made strategy that could be applied to a specific security problem we face now. But they can open for us new or forgotten ways of thinking about threats and the competitive security environment, offering a perspective that is missing in modern intellectual and educational circles. Free of technical jargon and without abstractions, classics favor simplicity over simplification, privilege practical insights over abstraction, and elevate the role of individuals over impersonal trends and institutions. And they describe the motivations and the drivers behind men’s actions, the core of any strategy. This book brings back some of these classic writers, examining their thoughts on strategy and politics.

The most informed and in-depth reappraisal of America’s defense strategy in decades, this book outlines a rigorous but practical approach, showing how the United States can prepare to win a war with China that we cannot afford to lose—precisely in order to deter that war from happening.

The purpose of this study is to provide a strategic framework which the United States can use to lead to better burden sharing outcomes, in turn driving greater and more aligned efforts by Washington’s allies and partners.

This paper examines the necessity for the United States to formulate a theory of success in a conflict over Taiwan that includes denial but also indicates how to favorably manage escalation – that is, achieving its strategic-political goals without, at a minimum, precipitating a massive attack on the United States.

Thank you very much for the invitation to testify. It is a great honor to be able to submit testimony to this important and timely Committee. Whether we like it or not, the world has now entered into an era of great power rivalry. While the United States and China are the two primary poles in this new old world, everyone – including Canada – will be profoundly affected.

This paper examines how four great powers in history have handled simultaneity …

“Our empowerment, our bolstering of military efforts is focused on denial – a goal that is in the most basic sense defensive …”

Economic ties linking the U.S. with China are insufficient to prevent a war …

The purpose of this study is to provide a strategic framework for how the U.S. should think about and act toward allies and partners in an era defined by great power competition…